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Contractor Beware—Increased Damages Ahead: The Tenth
Circuit Predicts That Oklahoma Would Allow New
Businesses to Recover Lost Profits in Specialty Beverages,
L.L.C. v. Pabst Brewing Co.*
I. Introduction
In 1854, the Court of the Exchequer in Hadley v. Baxendale formally
developed the concept of consequential damages arising from a breach of
contract.1 Cautious of the potential effect on commercial transactions, the
court expressly limited the award of consequential damages to only those
damages which were “in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they
made the contract.”2 Since the Court of the Exchequer’s landmark decision,
the array of remedies allowed as consequential damages has greatly expanded.
In 1997, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Florafax International, Inc. v. GTE
Market Resources, Inc. provided a modern interpretation of Hadley
specifically relating to the recovery of lost profits as consequential damages
for businesses in Oklahoma.3 There, the court applied a multipart test to aid
lower courts in the determination of when lost profits could appropriately be
recovered by businesses in Oklahoma.4
The idea that consequential damages include lost profits for established
businesses has gained general acceptance.5 However, the applicability of this
concept to new businesses has resulted in a split of opinion among the courts,
with some favoring the “new business rule,” prohibiting new businesses from
recovering damages for lost profits.6 Courts originally denied the recovery of
lost profits for new businesses on the theory of certainty, holding that these
businesses have “no provable data of past business from which the fact that

* The author would like to thank Brian M. McCall, associate professor, University of
Oklahoma College of Law, Roni Watson, Laura Watson, Mr. and Mrs. Tony Maggio, Mr. and
Mrs. Phil Albert, and Mr. and Mrs. Elby Beal.
1. See (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Exch. Div.).
2. Id.
3. See 1997 OK 7, ¶¶ 25-32, 933 P.2d 282, 292-93.
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., id.
6. Compare TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the new business rule was still in effect in Illinois), with O’Tool v. Genmar
Holdings, Inc., 387 F.3d 1188, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding that Delaware would move
away from the traditional new business rule), and MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d
652, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Arkansas would overrule the only state-court case
supporting the new business rule).
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anticipated profits would have been realized can be legally deduced.”7
Therefore, the amount of lost profits would “remain speculative, remote,
uncertain, and incapable of recovery.”8 Some circuits have now adopted a less
stringent approach and allow new businesses to recover lost profits in certain
circumstances.9 Recently, the Tenth Circuit joined the modern trend, and its
ruling greatly expanded the amount recoverable as consequential damages by
new businesses in Oklahoma. In Specialty Beverages, L.L.C. v. Pabst Brewing
Co., the Tenth Circuit interpreted Oklahoma law as allowing new businesses
to recover lost profits, just like more established businesses.10
This note argues that the Tenth Circuit’s recent opinion goes too far in
predicting that Oklahoma courts would abolish the new business rule.11 Part
II of this note discusses the evolution of Oklahoma’s case law governing the
recovery of consequential damages, and specifically lost profits for businesses.
Part III presents the facts and procedural history of Specialty Beverages, L.L.C.
v. Pabst Brewing Co. Part IV discusses the analysis used by the Tenth Circuit
in developing its holding. Part V analyzes the strengths and weaknesses in the
court’s reasoning, addresses the possible effects of the court’s opinion on
future commercial transactions, and provides an alternative to the Tenth
Circuit’s abandonment of the new business rule. This note concludes in Part
VI.
II. The Recovery of Lost Profits in Oklahoma Before Specialty Beverages
One of the earliest Oklahoma cases addressing the availability of lost profits
damages dates back to 1912. In Ft. Smith & Western Railroad Co. v.
Williams, the plaintiff contracted with a railroad company to transport a merrygo-round to a local park area where the plaintiff planned to charge for rides
during a picnic.12 The plaintiff expressly communicated to the railroad
company that the merry-go-round was to be used for the picnic and that it
needed to be set up for operation by August 14, 1908, the first day of the
picnic.13 The parties agreed that the merry-go-round would be delivered “not
7. E.g., Cent. Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 99 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1901),
abrogated by Cent. Telecomm, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 727-28 (8th Cir.
1986).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., MindGames, 218 F.3d at 658-59.
10. See 537 F.3d 1165, 1179 (10th Cir. 2008).
11. Oklahoma courts have not specifically used the term “new business rule” in reference
to this limitation, though the Tenth Circuit employed that label in Specialty Beverages. See id.
at 1178.
12. See 1912 OK 1, ¶ 0, 121 P. 275, 275.
13. Id.
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later than the morning of the 14th of August.”14 Nevertheless, the defendant
failed to deliver the merry-go-round until five o’clock in the evening on
August 14.15 In response, the plaintiff sued the railroad company for the
profits he lost during the first day of the picnic.16 At trial, the court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the jury’s verdict.17 After
having its motion for a new trial overruled, the defendant appealed the trial
court’s decision to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.18
The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the award of damages for lost profits
to the plaintiff.19 The court explained that if a carrier is given proper notice of
the potential of lost earnings as a result of a failure to deliver goods as
specified, lost profits may be the “most just and adequate measure of damages”
if they can be proven with a “reasonable degree of accuracy.”20 The court also
stated that “[t]he amount [of lost profits] may be estimated with only
reasonable accuracy; but the fact that profits were lost should require stricter
proof.”21
Four years after the Ft. Smith decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court again
considered lost-profits damages as an available remedy for a breach of
contract.22 In Bokoshe Smokeless Coal Co. v. Bray, the plaintiffs were in
possession of a coal mine held under a lease assigned to them by a third
party.23 The plaintiffs alleged that on December 15, 1912, the defendant
entered, “without right or authority,” onto the lands covering the coal lease and
took possession of the land and all of the personal property the plaintiffs kept
on the premises, violating the lease agreement and the assignment.24 As a
result of this unlawful possession, the plaintiffs sought to recover for the loss
of anticipated profits they would have made in the operation of the coal mine
if not for the defendant’s intrusion.25 The jury returned a verdict against the
defendant for wrongful eviction and awarded the plaintiffs $660 in lost
profits.26 The trial court entered judgment accordingly and overruled the
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. ¶ 11, 121 P. at 278.
20. Id. ¶ 9, 121 P. at 277.
21. Id. ¶ 8, 121 P. at 277.
22. See Bokoshe Smokeless Coal Co. v. Bray, 1916 OK 111, 155 P. 226.
23. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 155 P. at 227.
24. See id.
25. Id. ¶ 8, 155 P. at 229.
26. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 155 P. at 228. The only questions submitted to the jury were whether the
defendant had subjected the plaintiffs to wrongful eviction, and if so, how much of a loss in
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defendant’s motion for new trial, and the defendant appealed to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.27
The court stated that “[t]he general rule is that the anticipated profits of a
commercial business are too remote, speculative, and dependent upon
changing circumstances to warrant a judgment for their loss.”28 But, the court
continued, “There is an exception to this rule that the loss of profits from the
interruption of an established business may be recovered where the plaintiff
makes it reasonably certain by competent proof what the amount of his actual
loss was.”29 Applying this exception, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ request
for damages because the plaintiffs failed to procure an approximation of the
number of tons of coal that would have been produced absent the defendant’s
interruptions.30 The court held that the failure to approximate the volume of
lost coal meant that the plaintiffs had not met their evidentiary burden for
recovery of lost profits, making it impossible to properly estimate any damages
in a case premised solely on lost profits.31
In 1936, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reaffirmed the Ft. Smith holding and
further defined the burden on plaintiffs seeking to recover lost profits.32 In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sheets, the defendant, who was being sued for
failure to pay a balance due on a bill for merchandise, filed a cross-petition
seeking to recover lost profits resulting from damage to his business caused by
Firestone.33 Sheets operated a service station that sold Firestone tires.34 After
customers purchased Firestone tires from Sheets, many found workmanship
defects in the tires.35 The customers and Sheets complained about the quality
of the tires to Firestone, but the company refused to compensate the customers
or adjust the price for the defective tires.36
In his cross-petition, Sheets alleged that this refusal amounted to a violation
of his dealer’s contract with Firestone and that “he had completely lost his
business” as a result of this violation.37 Sheets produced various customers
who testified that they quit doing business with him as a result of the
profits the plaintiffs suffered as a result. Id. ¶ 3, 155 P. at 228.
27. Id.
28. Id. ¶ 9, 155 P. at 231 (quoting Cent. Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 96
(C.C.W.D. Mo. 1901) (court syllabus)).
29. Id. (quoting Central Coal, 111 F. at 96-97 (court syllabus)).
30. See id. ¶¶ 17-18, 155 P. at 232-33.
31. Id. ¶ 18, 155 P. at 233.
32. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sheets, 1936 OK 523, 62 P.2d 91.
33. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 62 P.2d at 92.
34. Id. ¶ 2, 62 P.2d at 92.
35. Id. ¶ 3, 62 P.2d at 92.
36. See id.
37. See id. ¶¶ 1-2, 62 P.2d at 92.
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defective-tire sales.38 Sheets also produced the service station’s books
showing the decrease in sales from the time he started the business until the
time his customer base vanished entirely.39 The trial court rendered judgment
according to the jury’s finding in favor of Sheets for $2,144.09, accounting for
Sheets’s lost business due to the breach.40 Firestone appealed the trial court’s
judgment.41
In its opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that because Sheets had
operated an established business, the amount of lost profits was not entirely
speculative and could be recovered as damages.42 In determining the
appropriateness of the lost-profits measure of damages, the court seemed to
lessen the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs, reiterating the holdings of other
recent opinions concluding that “uncertainty as to the amount of damages [for
lost profits] does not prevent recovery.”43 The court also held that because the
plaintiff had satisfied his burden to show some loss, “it [was] proper to let the
jury determine what the loss probably was from the best evidence the nature
of the case admitted.”44 Through its holdings in Bokoshe, Ft. Smith, and
Sheets, the Oklahoma Supreme Court began to take a more liberal approach
to the recovery of lost profits for established businesses, but recovery was still
treated as an exception to the general rule.
In Dieffenbach v. McIntyre, the Oklahoma Supreme Court further clarified
when businesses could recover lost profits for breaches of contract.45 There,
the plaintiff sought to rent an office space in the defendant’s building, located
outside of the business district of Tulsa.46 The plaintiff intended to move her
beauty parlor from its previous location in downtown Tulsa and to take
possession of all four of the defendant’s rental units.47 The plaintiff alleged
that she was granted assurance by the defendant that the current occupants
would vacate the units before June 1, 1946.48 The plaintiff claimed that only
two of the units had been vacated by June 1, 1946, and when she questioned
the defendant regarding the use of the other two units, the defendant reassured

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. ¶ 4, 62 P.2d at 92.
Id. ¶ 4, 62 P.2d at 92-93.
Id. ¶ 5, 62 P.2d at 93.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 62 P.2d at 93.
Id. ¶ 8, 62 P.2d at 93.
Id.
See 1952 OK 453, 254 P.2d 346.
Id. ¶ 2, 254 P.2d at 347.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 254 P.2d at 347.
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her that the current occupants would leave no later than June 7, 1946.49
Relying on this assurance, the plaintiff began to occupy one of the units.50
On August 1, 1946, the plaintiff vacated the premises, claiming that she
never obtained sole possession of all of the units, as promised by the
defendant.51 The plaintiff filed a claim to recover the rent paid, compensation
for repairs she made to the building, and “anticipated profits” her business had
lost as a result of her “removal from the building.”52 At trial, the court refused
to allow evidence relating to the plaintiff’s loss of anticipated profits, but still
entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for other damages.53 The defendant
appealed the judgement, and the plaintiff cross-appealed based on the refusal
of the court to allow the evidence relating to the plaintiff’s lost profits.54
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that “where the loss of anticipated
profits is claimed as an element of damages, the business claimed to have been
interrupted must be an established one.”55 In defining an “established
business,” the court stated that “it must be shown that it has been successfully
conducted for such a length of time and has such a trade established that the
profits therefrom are reasonably ascertainable.”56 The court denied the
plaintiff’s recovery of lost profits by holding that the plaintiff’s former,
downtown location could not be used to estimate lost profits for the new
location.57 Additionally, because the plaintiff had only attempted to occupy
the defendant’s building for two months, there was “not a sufficient length of
time to constitute her business there as an established business.”58
Once again, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s allowance for the recovery of
lost profits for a breach of contract appeared limited to only established
businesses. As stated in Bokoshe, when courts in Oklahoma initially
developed the rationale for the recoverability of lost profits for breach of
contract claims, the remedy was an exception to the general rule that only

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 254 P.2d at 347.
52. Id. ¶ 1, 254 P.2d at 346.
53. Id. ¶¶ 6, 11, 254 P.2d at 346, 347.
54. Id. ¶ 11, 254 P.2d at 347.
55. Id. ¶ 13, 254 P.2d at 349. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reiterated this holding several
years later in Plummer v. Fogley, 1961 OK 107, ¶¶ 7-8, 363 P.2d 238, 241. See infra text
accompanying notes 117-18.
56. Dieffenbach, ¶ 13, 254 P.2d at 349.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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damages directly flowing from the breach of the contract were recoverable.59
The Oklahoma Supreme Court changed this view in 1997.
In Florafax International, Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that lost profits for breach of contract are no longer the
exception to the rule, but are instead a “common measure of damages for
breach of contract.”60 The defendant in Florafax had contracted to supply
telemarketing services to Florafax, an established business that coordinated
flower delivery between florists and customers.61 Florafax lost customers as
a result of GTE’s alleged failure to properly staff its telemarketing services
around major holidays, such as Mother’s Day, when floral sales are known to
escalate.62
In Florafax’s action to recover lost profits, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
recited the specific set of elements that must be shown in order to recover lost
profits for a breach of contract.63 The court required that the losses (1) must
have been in “the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was
made,” (2) “flow[] directly or proximately from the breach,” and (3) be
“capable of reasonably accurate measurement or estimate.”64 The proponent
must prove these elements by a preponderance of the evidence in order to
recover.65
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not directly dealt with the issue of
recoverability of lost profits for new businesses, federal circuit courts have
recognized a growing trend among states to allow new businesses to recover
damages for lost profits.66 Although courts originally deemed lost profits
unrecoverable by new businesses because they considered such profits not
“capable of reasonably accurate measurement or estimate,”67 some circuits
now allow these damages on the grounds that “courts have become sufficiently

59. See Bokoshe Smokeless Coal Co. v. Bray, 1916 OK 111, ¶ 8, 155 P. 226, 229; see also
Carpenters’ Local 1686 v. Wallis, 1951 OK 293, ¶ 13, 237 P.2d 905, 908 (citing Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Sheets, 1936 OK 523, ¶ 8, 62 P.2d 91, 93; City of Collinsville v. Brickey, 1925
OK 885, ¶ 17, 242 P. 249, 253).
60. 1997 OK 7, ¶ 26, 933 P.2d 282, 292.
61. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9-10, 933 P.2d at 287, 288.
62. See id. ¶ 14, 933 P.2d at 289.
63. Id. ¶ 26, 933 P.2d at 292.
64. Id. (citing Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Merchant, 1962 OK 32, ¶ 0, 380 P.2d 682, 682).
65. Id. ¶ 42, 933 P.2d at 296.
66. See O’Tool v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 387 F.3d 1188, 1204 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing,
inter alia, MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g. Co., 218 F.3d 652, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2000); Bernadette
J. Bollas, Note, The New Business Rule and the Denial of Lost Profits, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 855,
859 (1987)).
67. Florafax, ¶ 26, 933 P.2d at 292; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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sophisticated in analyzing lost-earnings claims.”68 In 2004, the Tenth Circuit
joined the growing trend when it interpreted Delaware law and determined that
“the Delaware Supreme Court would, if directly faced with the issue, follow
the majority trend and reject strict application of the ‘new business’ rule.”69
In 2008, the Tenth Circuit revisited the recoverability of lost profits for new
businesses and predicted that Oklahoma would also move away from a rigid
application of the new business rule.70
III. Specialty Beverages, L.L.C. v. Pabst Brewing Co.: Statement of the
Case
In 2004, Specialty Beverages entered into a contract with Pabst Brewing
Company to become a distributor of Pabst’s beer.71 The relationship between
the two companies was premised on the Oklahoma Legislature’s intense
regulatory control over alcohol distribution in the form of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act (ABCA).72 This Act creates a “four-tiered system for
selling beer” in Oklahoma that prevents brewers of beer from selling “directly
to a wholesaler or retailer.”73 Instead, brewers must sell to a “non-resident”
seller, who holds a state-issued license to transact with wholesalers.74 This
non-resident seller “sells the beer to a licensed ‘wholesaler,’ who in turn sells
the beer to a licensed retail establishment.”75
At the time of its contract with Pabst Brewing, Specialty Beverages was a
non-resident seller of beer, founded in 2002 and licensed in February 2003.76
Pabst ranked as the largest supplier of “strong beer” to Oklahoma consumers.77
Pabst had previously contracted with Marrs Distributing Company, another
non-resident seller of beer, granting that company the exclusive right to
distribute Pabst products in Oklahoma.78 During the course of the contract
68. MindGames, 218 F.3d at 658.
69. O’Tool, 387 F.3d at 1205.
70. See Specialty Beverages, L.L.C. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 537 F.3d 1165, 1178 (10th Cir.
2008).
71. Id. at 1171.
72. Id. at 1169 (citing 37 OKLA. STAT. §§ 501-599 (2001)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1170.
76. Id.
77. Id. Oklahoma law differentiates between two types of beer in its regulations. “Strong”
beer contains “more than three and two-tenths percent (3.2%) alcohol by weight,” whereas “low
point” beer contains “more than one-half of one percent (½ of 1%) alcohol by volume, and not
more than three and two-tenths percent (3.2%) alcohol by weight.” Id. at 1169 (quoting 37
OKLA. STAT. §§ 163.1-163.2(1) (2001)).
78. Id.
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with Marrs, however, “Pabst had become increasingly dissatisfied,” chiefly on
account of Marrs’s failure to maintain inventory of Pabst’s beer on hand.79
This policy inconvenienced wholesalers and retailers who wished to purchase
Pabst’s beer by requiring them to place orders for Pabst’s beer “several months
in advance” of their desired delivery.80 Additionally, Marrs “did not make any
effort to market Pabst’s brands to retail establishments,” but only relied on
wholesalers to purchase the beer.81
Oklahoma marketing manager for Pabst, Chuck Lefholz, contacted
Specialty Beverages to discuss the possibility for Specialty Beverages to
replace Marrs as Pabst’s strong beer distributor.82 Lefholz voiced some of
Pabst’s frustrations with Marrs and told Specialty Beverages that the Pabst
contract with Marrs was only a “one-year terminable-at-will ‘appointment
letter,’” that the term had already expired, and that Pabst had no intentions to
renew.83 After negotiations with Specialty Beverages, Pabst sent Specialty
Beverages the same kind of letter to appoint Specialty Beverages as a
distributor of Pabst’s beer in place of Marrs.84
After receiving this letter, Specialty Beverages took on considerable
expenses to ensure that it could fully meet Pabst’s distribution needs. In
anticipation of these needs, “Specialty Beverages tripled its warehouse space
and added temperature controls in the warehouse in order to store” Pabst’s
beer in the appropriate conditions.85 Specialty Beverages also “added office
space and administrative staff[,] bought a refrigerated trailer to store Pabst’s
keg products,” increased its sales force, increased its marketing, borrowed
money, and “increased its line of credit” to buy the beer.86 Not surprisingly,
it also “bought thousands of cases of Pabst beer.”87
On April 29, 2004, when Marrs learned of the agreement that Pabst had
entered into with Specialty Beverages, Marrs sued Pabst for breach of the
parties’ exclusivity agreement, which contained no termination date.88 The
trial court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting “Pabst from
breaching its distribution agreement with Marrs and order[ing] Pabst and
Marrs to retain the status quo” of their previously existing contractual

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1171.
See id. at 1170.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1170-71.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1171-72.
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relationship.89 As a result, “Pabst directed Specialty Beverages not to sell any
of [the beer it purchased] to . . . retailers.”90
In the weeks following the issuance of the restraining order, Pabst continued
to encourage Specialty Beverages to keep placing orders, which it did.91 Over
the next couple of months, representatives from Specialty Beverages attempted
to communicate with Pabst on numerous occasions, seeking direction on how
to proceed with customers and the beer in its warehouses.92 After many failed
attempts at communication, Specialty Beverages stopped paying for its orders,
and the beer in Specialty Beverages’ possession grew stale and ruined.93
“By February 2005, Specialty Beverages went out of business,” having
injured its reputation with the many retailers to whom it promised to supply
Pabst beer.94 Specialty Beverages then sued Pabst alleging breach of contract
and fraud.95 At trial, the jury “entered a verdict in Specialty Beverages’ favor
on the breach-of-contract claim, awarding $274,022 in damages for economic
loss and $400,000 in damages for the diminished value of Specialty
Beverages’ business.”96 Both parties appealed to the Tenth Circuit.97
IV. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision
On appeal, Pabst argued that the district court erred in denying Pabst’s
“motion for a judgment as a matter of law on [Specialty Beverages’] lost
profits damages claim.”98 Specifically, Pabst contended “that the court erred
because Oklahoma’s ‘new business’ rule prohibits companies without an
established track record from recovering lost profits damages.”99 Reviewing
this issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
would allow the recovery of lost profits by a new business.100 The court
directed most of its analysis to the third element of the Florafax test, which
requires profits to be “capable of reasonably accurate measurement or
estimate.”101
89. Id. at 1172.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1173.
92. See id. at 1172-73.
93. See id. at 1173.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1177.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1178.
101. Florafax Int’l, Inc. v. GTE Mkt. Res., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 26, 933 P.2d 282, 292 (emphasis
added); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Attempting to predict how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would apply the
new business rule, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion traced the development of the
theory for recoverability of lost profits through the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
prior decisions.102 The Tenth Circuit plotted the evolution of Oklahoma case
law from the general rule prohibiting any recovery of future profits to the rule
in Florafax requiring only a showing of reasonable certainty for recovery.103
Given this “current legal landscape,” the court determined that “the Oklahoma
Supreme Court would allow for the recovery of reasonably estimated lost
future profits, regardless of whether the business was well established.”104
Following this analysis of the lost profits rules in Oklahoma, the court
stated that “because the business venture at issue was generally established,”
Specialty Beverages should be considered an established business.105 The
court explained that because Specialty Beverages had been in business for two
years, it would not even qualify as a new enterprise.106 Additionally, in
reference to the contract with Pabst, the court stated that “the agreement
dictated that Specialty [Beverages] would essentially step into the shoes of
Marrs, an established business,” in the contract.107 Because Speciality
Beverages was just substituting for Marrs, the court held that any damages
suffered by Specialty Beverages could easily be proven with the requisite
degree of certainty.108 Having found that Specialty Beverages proved the other
elements of the Florafax test, the court held that “Oklahoma law would allow
for Specialty [Beverages] to recover damages for anticipated lost profits.”109
V. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion failed to properly predict the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the new business rule and the rule’s
application to Specialty Beverages and Pabst. First, the Tenth Circuit failed
to provide any case law to substantiate its view that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court would go so far as to abolish the new business rule. Second, the court
102. See Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d at 1178. Because of a lack of federal legislation
dealing with the application of the new business rule, the Tenth Circuit observed the mandate
of the Erie doctrine to apply state law. See Erie R.R. Co. V. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
(“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the state.”).
103. See Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d at 1178.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1178-79.
109. Id. at 1179.
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incorrectly concluded that Specialty Beverages was an established business for
purposes of recovering lost profits. Finally, the court failed to properly
consider the implications of its ruling on future contracts between new
businesses and customers.
A. The Case Law Suggests That the Oklahoma Supreme Court Would Not
Abolish the New Business Rule
While the Tenth Circuit appropriately traced the evolution of the recovery
of lost profits as an available remedy in Oklahoma, it failed to substantiate its
ultimate conclusion with any Oklahoma case law. In its opinion, the court
correctly observed that Oklahoma case law reveals a movement from a general
disallowance of lost profits to a rule allowing recovery of lost profits for
businesses “so long as they can demonstrate that those losses are ‘capable of
reasonably accurate measurement or estimate.’”110 However, the court failed
to explain how this sequence of case law led to the conclusion that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court would go so far as to abolish the new business rule
and allow new businesses to recover lost profits. Indeed, much of the case law
in Oklahoma has directly pointed to the contrary, holding that while the
requirements for recovering lost profits may be loosened, the rule still applies
only to established businesses.111
From the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s early adoption of the rule allowing
recovery of lost profits in Bokoshe, the court clearly established that recovery
was to be allowed only in one specific circumstance—where the business
injured was an established one.112 There was no exception carved out for those
businesses that were not established. Instead, new businesses would fall under
the general rule barring the recovery of lost profits because the damages were
deemed “too remote, speculative, and dependent upon changing circumstances
to warrant a judgment for their loss.”113
Even as the rule allowing recovery of lost profits as a standard remedy for
a breach of contract has gained acceptance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
been consistent in limiting its application to only those businesses that were
110. Id. at 1178 (quoting Digital Design Group, Inc. v. Info. Builders, Inc., 2001 OK 21, ¶
34, 24 P.3d 834, 844); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
111. See Plummer v. Fogley, 1961 OK 107, ¶ 8, 363 P.2d 238, 241; Dieffenbach v.
McIntyre, 1952 OK 453, ¶ 13, 254 P.2d 346, 349 (both holding that before lost profits may be
recovered, a business must show proven success for a sufficient length of time to demonstrate
that it had become “established”); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
112. See Bokoshe Smokeless Coal Co. v. Bray, 1916 OK 111, ¶¶ 9-10, 155 P. 226, 231
(quoting Cent. Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 96-98 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1901) (court
syllabus and main opinion)).
113. Id. ¶ 9, 155 P. at 231 (quoting Central Coal, 111 F. at 96 (court syllabus)); see also
supra text accompanying note 28.
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established. In Dieffenbach, the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically refused
to award lost profits to the plaintiff because there was no finding that the
plaintiff operated an established business.114 The court expressly held that for
a plaintiff to recover lost profits, “the business claimed to have been
interrupted must be an established one.”115 The Oklahoma Supreme Court also
explicitly defined an “established business” as one that could show “that it has
been successfully conducted for such a length of time and has such a trade
established that the profits therefrom are reasonably ascertainable.”116 Instead
of offering any evidence of moving toward dissolving the new business rule,
the Dieffenbach court reaffirmed the applicability of the rule and defined the
scope of an “established business,” further limiting those who could recover
lost profits.
Similarly, over eight years later, in Plummer v. Fogley, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court again expressly refused to allow new businesses to recover lost
profits.117 Again, the court adopted the view that
[w]here the loss of anticipated profits is claimed as an element of
damages, the business claimed to have been interrupted must be an
established one, and it must be shown that it has been successfully
conducted for such a length of time and has such a trade established
that the profits therefrom are reasonably ascertainable.118
The pronouncement by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Dieffenbach, and
again in Plummer, is precisely the clarification the Tenth Circuit was searching
for in Specialty Beverages. Instead of attempting to guess the “legal
landscape” in Oklahoma,119 the Tenth Circuit needed to look no further than
Dieffenbach and Plummer. In both of these cases, the Tenth Circuit would
have found unambiguous statements by the highest court of the state, directly
on point.
Given the absence of more recent holdings by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
to the contrary, the court’s holding in Dieffenbach stands as a clear view of the
application of the new business rule in Oklahoma. Nevertheless, the Tenth
Circuit failed to discuss this case’s holding in its opinion. The case was cited

114. Dieffenbach, ¶ 13, 254 P.2d at 349.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. 1961 OK 107, ¶¶ 7-8, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (citing, inter alia, Dieffenbach, 1952 OK 453,
254 P.2d 346).
118. Id. ¶ 8, 363 P.2d at 241 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying notes 5556.
119. See Specialty Beverages, L.L.C. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 537 F.3d 1165, 1178 (10th Cir.
2008); see also supra text accompanying note 104.
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by both Specialty Beverages and Pabst in their respective briefs,120 and yet the
court chose to ignore this precedent. The holding in Dieffenbach hardly allows
for any interpretation that the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s “legal landscape”
would allow new businesses to recover lost profits.
Nor does there appear to be any other case law by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court ever hinting at a liberalization of the new business rule to the extent
argued for by Specialty Beverages. Instead, there is only reaffirmation from
Ft. Smith through Bokoshe, Firestone, Dieffenbach, Plummer, and Florafax
that the new business rule remains valid in Oklahoma.121 While the history of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s holdings shows a movement toward the
acceptance of lost profits as a normal remedy for breaches of contract
involving established businesses, the court has shown no inclination to allow
the recovery of these damages for businesses that do not have a track record
of proven profits.122
B. The Court Incorrectly Deemed Specialty Beverages an Established
Business
After its lengthy discussion of the new business rule in Oklahoma, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the rule would not apply because Specialty Beverages
was not in fact a new business.123 The court observed that “the [Specialty
Beverages–Pabst] agreement dictated that Specialty would essentially step into
the shoes of Marrs, an established business.”124 Therefore, the court concluded
that Specialty Beverages could “rely on Marrs’s experiences as a baseline” to
demonstrate its lost profits by a preponderance of the evidence.125
Furthermore, the court stated that because Specialty Beverages “had been in
existence for two years prior to reaching the agreement with Pabst[,]. . . . it
was not a new enterprise.”126
When it was approached by Pabst regarding the distribution of Pabst’s beer,
Specialty Beverages had been licensed for only a few months.127 Even when
120. See, e.g., Cross-Appellant Pabst Brewing Co., Inc.’s Reply Brief at 4, Specialty
Beverages, 537 F.3d 1165 (Nos. 06-6243, 06-6250); Appellant & Cross-Appellee Specialty
Beverages’ Combined Response & Reply Brief at 11, Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d 1165 (Nos.
06-6243, 06-6250).
121. See discussion supra Part II.
122. See Florafax Int’l, Inc. v. GTE Mkt. Res., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 48, 933 P.2d 282, 297
(allowing recovery of lost profits because the facts were “sufficiently close to be analogized to
the established business situation”).
123. Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d at 1178.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1178-79.
126. Id. at 1178.
127. See id. at 1170-71.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss4/6

2010]

NOTES

831

the appointment letter was sent to Specialty Beverages, it had been in business
for less than two years.128 Additionally, Specialty Beverages had never
distributed such a high volume of beer or such a well known brand as Pabst,
having only distributed “lesser known, smaller beverage brands” since its
formation.129 In its opinion, the court acknowledged that “those brands did not
have the volume of business that would make and keep Specialty Beverages
profitable.”130 But the court seemed to later ignore this fact in its conclusion
that Specialty Beverages was an “established” business.131 It would be nearly
impossible for a business to be “established” without customers who could
“make and keep” it profitable. Considering that Specialty Beverages’
customer base before the Pabst contract could not achieve profitability, it
would have been an insurmountable hurdle for Specialty Beverages to pass the
Dieffenbach test, requiring that a business be “successfully conducted for such
a length of time and [have] such a trade established that profits therefrom are
reasonably ascertainable.”132
In reaching its conclusion, the court also failed to consider the past dealings
between Specialty Beverages and Pabst. Specifically, the court’s opinion
references trial testimony of Pabst’s general counsel regarding the formation
of the distribution agreement to be entered into with Specialty Beverages.133
The general counsel stated that in drafting the agreement, Pabst made
modifications to the standard distribution agreement, because “Specialty
Beverages was a new company without a track record,” requiring unique
contract provisions.134 This testimony suggests that in the minds of the parties
at the time of formation of the contract, Specialty Beverages was a new
business.
The court also supported its conclusion that Specialty Beverages was an
“established” business by stating that in using Marrs’s success as a “baseline,”
Specialty Beverages could demonstrate that its lost profits could be proved
with sufficient certainty.135 However, Marrs and Specialty Beverages were
distinct entities. There was no evidence of any relationship between them that
would suggest that the profits of Specialty Beverages would mirror those of

128. See id.
129. Id. at 1172.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1178-79.
132. Plummer v. Fogley, 1961 OK 107, ¶ 8, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (citing, inter alia,
Dieffenbach v. McIntyre, 1952 OK 453, ¶ 13, 254 P.2d 346, 249); see also supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
133. Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d at 1171.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1178-79; see also supra text accompanying note 125.
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Marrs under the distribution agreement. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit stated
that Marrs’s experiences with Pabst could be used by Specialty Beverages to
estimate its own success.136 Using this reasoning, the court improperly
classified Specialty Beverages as an “established” business “because the
business venture at issue was generally established”;137 however, Oklahoma
case law requires that the determination of established-business status be based
on the business entity, not the venture.138
Each company’s formation of its own balance sheets can yield largely
different results with respect to profitability. The Tenth Circuit ignored this
basic understanding that each corporation or entity will have its own needs and
obligations, and that the success of one corporation does not equate to the
success of a competitor, even one acting under the same contract. Specialty
Beverages had to confront distinct issues in order to fulfill its contract with
Pabst that Marrs did not need to address. Specifically, in anticipation of
receiving Pabst’s beer, Specialty Beverages increased its debt, its operating
expenses, its overhead, and its employee base.139 Also, Specialty Beverages’
corporate structure at the commencement of the contract was not identical to
that of Marrs. In assuming that Marrs’s profitability under the contract could
be used to estimate Specialty Beverages’ success, the Tenth Circuit went too
far.
Evaluating the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning, it appears that the court may have
had in mind the end goal of designating Specialty Beverages as an
“established” business. In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the court struggled
to place Specialty Beverages into this category. The court ignored the many
characteristics that made Specialty Beverages a new business at the time the
contract was entered into between the parties. To fill that void, the court
focused on the success of an established competitor to prove that Specialty
Beverages’ damages were not too speculative.140 With so much evidence
suggesting that Specialty Beverages was a new business, the court’s finding
to the contrary seems problematic.

136. Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d at 1178-79.
137. Id. at 1178 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
138. See Plummer v. Fogley, 1961 OK 107, ¶ 7, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (examining whether the
business itself was established by looking at the length of time the business was in existence as
well as the consistency of the business’s profits).
139. See Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d at 1172; see also supra text accompanying notes 8587.
140. See Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d at 1178-79.
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C. The Court Failed to Properly Consider the Implications of Its Ruling on
Future Contracts Between New Businesses and Customers
In establishing that new businesses should also be able to recover lost
profits, the Tenth Circuit failed to address the implications of its findings on
future commercial transactions. Specifically, the court failed to consider that
abolishing the new business rule would provide disincentives to those
considering entering into contracts with new businesses. First, increased
damages in the form of lost profits present an increase in liability in the event
of a breach by those who enter into contracts with new businesses. Second,
the court’s holding requires more due diligence by those businesses wishing
to enter into contracts with new businesses. Lastly, the holding increases the
cost of contract drafting for those wishing to enter into contracts with new
businesses.
1. Increased Liability
When an individual or a business entity enters into an agreement with a new
business, there are additional risks that would not be present when dealing
with experienced businesses. Obviously, businesses that have shown a pattern
of success in dealing with similar contracts provide greater certainty to those
with whom they contract that their success will continue in the current
transaction. For new businesses, much of this goodwill has yet to be
established. Thus, concerns about stability and efficiency may already
produce disincentives for participating in a transaction with a newer business.
The Tenth Circuit’s conclusion in Specialty Beverages produces another
significant disincentive. Without the new business rule, if the contract falls
apart, the individual who has contracted with the new business may now be
liable for extensive damages resulting from lost profits that have yet to be
realized by the new business. Effectively, this could produce extensive
damages that are beyond those contemplated by those contracting with new
businesses at the time of the contract formation. This potential liability, in
addition to the risks already present with new businesses, may deter other
businesses from entering into contracts with new businesses and thereby lead
to less business and profitability for these new businesses.
2. Increased Due Diligence
The new finding articulated by the Tenth Circuit will also require attorneys
to perform additional diligence when clients wish to contract with new
businesses. When the court looked to Marrs’s profits as a “baseline” from
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which to measure Specialty Beverages’ profitability,141 it created an additional
risk for those wishing to enter into contracts with new businesses. An analysis
based on a competitor’s profits may require attorneys to conduct additional
diligence regarding the new business’s competitors before the client enters into
a contract. Considering that new businesses, by definition, have no consistent
showing of profitability, a transactional attorney may need to examine the
profitability of other competitors in similar ventures in order to predict
damages or the cost of breach if a party needs to change its position in the
contract after its formation.
This additional cost may not be required in smaller transactions; however,
if the contract requires the new business to invest substantial resources in order
to effectively perform its duties under the contract, a breach could result in an
award of significant damages. Therefore, a proper estimation of the cost of
breach would need to include research into other competitors’ profitability.
The additional cost associated with this extra due diligence provides yet
another disincentive for companies to contract with new businesses.
3. Increased Contract Drafting Costs
After incurring significant costs in additional diligence, if an individual
wishes to pursue an agreement with a new business, it would be prudent to
construct additional contract language limiting the recoverability of lost-profits
damages for the new business. In reality, these costs may not be significant,
but they still produce an additional disincentive to those wishing to contract
with a new business.
Many new businesses are often not in the best position to undergo extensive
negotiation regarding contracts with new customers. Often, the new business’s
eagerness to remain profitable and to acquire new customers will result in its
acceptance of contracts that may not be as favorable as it had originally
desired. For instance, in Specialty Beverages, the Pabst contract was Specialty
Beverages’ “big break” that was going to keep Specialty Beverages
profitable.142 Given Specialty Beverages’ need to keep the contract alive,143 it
was not in the best position to negotiate, and like other new businesses, if it
had been offered a contract that limited damages recoverable upon a breach,
it may have been forced to accept these terms. While this practical reality will
effectively mitigate some of the risk incurred in dealing with new businesses,
these types of contract provisions injure new businesses and require additional
141. Id. at 1178; see also supra text accompanying note 125.
142. Specialty Beverages, 537 F.3d at 1172.
143. See id. (observing that sales of the brands Specialty Beverages had been distributing
prior to receiving Pabst’s appointment letter were insufficient to “make and keep Specialty
Beverages profitable”).
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costs in contract drafting, which may actually produce an additional
disincentive for entering into agreements with these businesses.
On its face, a rule allowing new businesses to recover lost profits appears
to favor those businesses. The theory for allowing new businesses to recover
lost profits has been grounded in the idea that those contracting with new
businesses may take advantage of them, knowing that new businesses are
limited in the damages they can recover.144 But allowing these businesses to
recover damages that may not be representative of their actual losses (by
estimating damages based on other experienced businesses) provides an
additional disincentive to those wishing to contract with these businesses,
which may lead to less activity, profitability, and growth by new businesses.
Additionally, if parties were to continue to contract with new businesses,
increased costs in conducting due diligence and redrafting contracts would
create even more disincentives. The additional disincentives could result in
a lack of new customers and growth for these businesses as others opted to do
business with their more experienced competitors. In the end, a rule that was
intended to aid new businesses may in fact hurt them and decrease their
profitability. The Tenth Circuit failed to acknowledge these effects of its
determination.
D. An Alternative to the Court’s Abandonment of the New Business Rule
After Specialty Beverages, lower courts are left to determine on a case-bycase basis whether a new business’s profits are “capable of reasonably accurate
measurement” before allowing recovery. The per se rule presented in
Dieffenbach—prohibiting the recovery of lost profits for new businesses—did
not require such a determination.145 Moving away from a per se rule compels
courts to examine sophisticated issues of corporate capital structure, business
profitability, and customer relations of a new business to determine if profits
are “capable of reasonably accurate measurement.”146 Such a sophisticated and
extensive analysis of a new business requires courts to go beyond their area of
expertise, thereby wasting limited judicial resources.147
144. See TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 726 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
“courts have recognized that a strict application of the rule could encourage tortious behavior
or the breaking of contracts by those dealing with new businesses”).
145. See Dieffenbach v. McIntyre, 1952 OK 453, ¶ 13, 254 P.2d 346, 349; see also supra
text accompanying notes 55-58.
146. Florafax Int’l, Inc. v. GTE Mkt. Res., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 26, 933 P.2d 282, 292; see also
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
147. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that if a “business is a new one or if it is
a speculative one,” such a determination is “more difficult,” requiring courts to rely on the “aid
of expert testimony, economic and financial data, market surveys and analyses, business records
of similar enterprises, and the like.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. b
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Instead of replacing the per se rule established by Dieffenbach with a pure
facts-and-circumstances determination, other courts and legislatures may
prefer a hybrid approach. An appropriate alternative would be a rule
prohibiting the recovery of lost profits for new businesses upon a breach of
contract except when the breach was a result of willful or wanton conduct by
the breaching party. Such a rule would absorb the benefits of both the per se
and facts-and-circumstances alternatives without negatively impacting new
businesses.
First, this rule would prevent courts from performing a pure facts-andcircumstances analysis, thereby preserving judicial resources. The rule would
also decrease the disincentives present after Specialty Beverages for those
wishing to contract with new businesses.148 Additionally, if such a rule were
adopted, it may be less likely that those contracting with new businesses would
attempt to limit the recovery of lost profits by contract modification, because
they would be secure in the knowledge that lost profits would only be
recoverable upon a willful or wanton breach.
A hybrid approach would also properly address the major policy concern
cited by opponents of the new business rule—that new businesses could easily
become victims because of their inability to recover profits.149 Instead, in
cases where the business suffered as a result of a willful or wanton breach, the
new business would be granted relief in the form of lost-profits damages. This
would produce a deterrent to those contracting with new businesses who wish
to damage these businesses. A hybrid approach would more effectively fulfill
the Tenth Circuit’s goals in joining the national trend toward the abolition of
a strict new business rule, but would also produce a rule with significantly
fewer negative implications than a complete abandonment of the new business
rule.
VI. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Specialty Beverages represented an
improper interpretation of Oklahoma case law. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
has followed a clear and unambiguous pattern of limiting the recovery of lost
profits to only established businesses. There is no evidence that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court would adopt the Tenth Circuit’s liberal interpretation of the
new business rule in Oklahoma. Instead, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
(1981).
148. The concerns of increased liability, increased due diligence, and increased cost of
contract drafting would be reduced by allowing the recovery of lost profits only in isolated
circumstances.
149. See TK-7 Corp., 993 F.2d at 726; see also supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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consistently rejected the idea that new businesses may recover lost profits, a
fact which the Tenth Circuit refused to acknowledge. The court also failed to
acknowledge and consider the many effects of its decision on new businesses
in Oklahoma, leading to a rule that produces an overall disincentive for those
wishing to contract with new businesses in the future. Allowing the recovery
of lost profits for new businesses clearly goes beyond the boundaries for the
recovery of consequential damages established in Hadley v. Baxendale by
including damages that were not ascertainable and within the contemplation
of both parties at the time of the forming of the contract.
Brandon M. Watson
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